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Introduction
This paper tests whether wages in Portuguese banking depend on the employers'ability to pay. Although a number of studies have examined how economy-wide wages are a¤ected by …rm or industry pro…tability 1 , wage determination in a speci…c single industry has been largely overlooked. 2 The Portuguese banking sector provides an interesting case study for analysing rentsharing issues. In the eighties and early nineties, Portuguese banking experienced a successful deregulatory reform (OECD, 1999) -comprising not only the abolishment of price and entry barriers but also a privatisation program -which was accompanied by a simultaneous rise in the wage premium and …rm pro…ts (Monteiro, 2007) . In addition, despite the coordinated bargaining mechanism prevailing in the industry -where trade unions and a group of banks meet each year to negotiate a single collective wage agreement 3 -there is evidence of bargaining over wages at …rm level. Indeed, the wage drift -the di¤erential between the wage de…ned by the collective agreement and the actual wage paid -has increased since early nineties (Aperta et al., 1994) and was the second highest in 1999 among 16 industries in Portugal (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005) .
To our knowledge, this study is the …rst to provide evidence on rent-sharing allowing for wage inertia, which is an important real-world phenomenon and using a system-GMM estimator. We also make use of an unexplored and rich data at …rm level collected by Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (APB) which covers 18 years, from 1988 through 2005, and o¤ers information about …rm human capital characteristics.
Data, model speci…cation and results
The dataset released every year by APB in the yearly Boletim Informativo consists of data from company accounts of all banks in Portugal. Beyond standard …nancial and operational information, the dataset reports other …rm characteristics such as ownership, size and age, and portrays the workforce in terms of schooling, tenure, type of activity and occupation in each bank. Summary statistics for the data are presented Table 1 . The key variables, log wages and pro…ts per employee, are computed following the usual practice in the literature (Hildreth and Oswald, 1997) . Thus, the log average wage is constructed as the logarithm of the ratio between the reported wage bill and total employment. Pro…t per employee is obtained by taking sales revenues less operational costs less reported wage bill and dividing by total employment. 4 The capital-labour ratio is obtained by dividing …xed assets by total employment. All monetary measures are expressed in current 10 3 Euros. of the total banking workforce, as public banks are much larger (more then 3 times) than the sector average. Firm age and capital-labour ratio also re ‡ect this dichotomy between publicly and privately owned banks, as the former are, on average, older and less capital intensive than their private counterparts (not shown in the table).
In terms of human capital attributes, banks employ, on average, a higher proportion of graduated (university degree) and young employees (5 or less years of tenure). Again, this is more pronounced for all privately owned …rms, but in particular for foreign …rms, which have more than half of the total workforce in these two categories. Finally, banking employees are working mainly in intermediate/middle occupations and in other activities than the commercial one (public employees are the only exception).
For the empirical analysis, we specify two panel data models, one static and one dynamic:
where subscripts i and t index bank i and time t; w is average log wage, P W is pro…ts per worker; F and P are indicators for foreign and public banks respectively, Z is a set of other regressors that vary by bank and time, v is an unobservable bank e¤ect and " is an error term. In our speci…cations, Z includes time-varying measures of …rm size (thousands of employees) and …rm age, capital-labour ratio, four attributes of the workforce -educational attainments (three categories), seniority (three categories), type of activity (two categories) and occupation (four categories) -and time (year) e¤ects. Table 2 reports empirical results for the wage equation (1) . Column 1 shows …xed estimates for the whole sample when Z includes …rm size, …rm age, capital-labour ratio, bank and time …xed e¤ects. Column 2 adds eight variables regarding all workforce attributes presented in Table 1 to previous speci…cation. Column 3 uses the speci…cation adopted in column 1 but applied to the sample of column 2. All columns report the coe¢ cient estimates of the regressors and their respective standard errors (clustered to control for the non-independence of repeated observations of the same …rm). Comparing the results from the three speci…cations, we see that the estimates of 1 are generally una¤ected by the inclusion of human regressors. However, as these regressors are jointly signi…cant at 10% (the joint signi…cance test has an F-statistic of 1.80, with a p-value of .091), our preferred speci…cation is the most expanded one presented in column 2. Thus, according to this speci…cation, the estimated e¤ect of pro…ts per employee on log wages is .001, with a t-statistic of 2.52 and a p-value of .014. Despite small when compared to previous studies (e.g., Arai, 2003 , Dobbelaere, 2004 or Budd et al., 2005 , it implies a notable wagepro…t elasticity of .094. 5 This …gure is below the elasticities found by Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Van Reen (1996) and Estevão and Tevlin (2003) , between :20 and :29, but above the range of elasticities usually found in the literature of domestic rent-sharing, between :006 and :05 (Budd et al., 2005) . This result is thus consistent with previous evidence of …rm-level bargaining. However, this elasticity is much higher than the one found by Arai (2003), who study rent-sharing under similar labour market features in Sweden. 6 Moreover, in accordance with the wage-setting system in the sector, but in contrast to earlier …ndings that show that public and foreign …rms tend to appropriate higher proportions of rents, the degree of rent-sharing is independent of bank ownership. Only public banks present a sizable, but insigni…cant, positive di¤erence in rent-sharing. Public banks also pay substantially less (24 per cent: e :276 1 = :241) than their private counterparts when workforce characteristics are controlled for.
The bank size e¤ect is surprisingly negative in all speci…cations, being only marginally signi…cant (p-value of :098) in our preferred model. 7 Firm age has a notable and signi…cant e¤ect on log wages of :054; implying that more "visible" banks pay higher wages. Capital per worker also has a positive e¤ect of .001 (p-value =:037), similar in magnitude to that reported in Sweden or USA (Arai, 2003) .
To allow for wage inertia and to investigate whether potential simultaneity of wages and pro…ts, and measurement error, a¤ect the results, we also estimate a dynamic version of wage equation (1). Table 3 repeats variable speci…cation of Table 2 for the dynamic wage equation (2) .
Given the presence of bank-speci…c e¤ects, the estimation of equation (2) by OLS, …xed or random e¤ects, is inconsistent since, by de…nition, w it 1 is correlated with v i . One possible solution is to take …rst di¤erences to eliminate bank-…xed e¤ect and apply the Arellano and Bond (1991) …rst-di¤erenced generalized method of moments (GMM). This method allows us to control for the bias introduced by omitted time-invariant variables. However, if "the lagged levels of the series are only weakly correlated with subsequent …rst-di¤erences, so that the instruments available for the …rst-di¤erenced equations are weak" (Bond et al., 2001, p.6) , this solution has poor …nite sample properties on bias and precision. Another possibility, which we follow in this study, consists of estimating the system-GMM presented by Blundell and Bond (1998) . This system combines a set of moment conditions for the …rst-di¤erenced equations with a set of moment conditions implied for level equations. Relative to the original GMM, the estimation of the system-GMM is preferable when the dependent and/or independent variables are persistent.
Following Bowsher (2003) , the choice of our instruments is parsimonious. We use w it 2 as instruments for the …rst-di¤erenced equation and w it 1 as instruments for the equations in level. The explanatory variables, P W it , P W it F it and P W it P it are treated as endogenous. In the estimation, we use two to three lags of their levels as instruments for the …rst-di¤erenced equations and lagged …rst-di¤erences as instruments for the level equations. The remaining explanatory variables are treated as predetermined. Therefore, we use in the …rst-di¤erenced equations their levels lagged one to three periods and contemporaneous …rst-di¤erences as instruments for the equations in levels. We also report results for the two-step GMM estimation procedure, following the correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) .
In Table 3 , the Sargan and the Di¤erence Sargan overindenti…cation tests do not reject the validity of instruments used in each regression. In particular, Di¤erence Sargan tests indicate the validity of the extra instruments used in the system-GMM estimation when compared to the original Arellano and Bond (1991) proposal. The serial correlation tests based on the …rst-di¤erenced residuals fail to reject the hypothesis of no second-order correlation. These results, read in conjunction with (the statistically signi…cant) high persistence in wages (always above :66), indicate that the system-GMM procedure is appropriate to estimate our dynamic panel model. Notes: Signi…cance levels: : 10% : 5% : 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is log average wage. The regressions are estimated by the system GMM procedure as discussed in Blundell and Bond (1998) , and include time e¤ects. The estimation details, including the instrumens used, are described in Section 2. Sargan is the test for overidentifying restrictions. Di¤S-AB is the di¤erence in the Sargan test between the system and the estimation in …rst-di¤erences; df stands for degrees of freedom and pv stands for p-value of the test. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for …rst-and second-order serial correlation in …rst-di¤erenced residuals. Table 3 provides further support for the existence of strong rent-sharing in the Portuguese banking sector. In all three speci…cations, the e¤ect of pro…ts per employee on log wages is equal to :002 (twice larger than before) and statistically signi…cant at the 10% level.
The implied pro…t-per-employee wage elasticities are thus considerably larger than the ones found previously with …xed e¤ects. Considering the most expanded speci…cation presented in column 2, the GMM estimate indicates that a 1% increase in the banks'pro…tability increases wages by :15%: Taken together, the pro…t-per-employee wage elasticities established in both (static and dynamic) models, imply an impact on wages due to a movement from the bottom to the top of pro…ts distribution, between 46% and 75%: These Lester's (1952) "range of wages" are therefore well above the 16% and 24% established for the UK (Hildreth and 8 Oswald,1997) and the USA (Blanch ‡ower et al., 1996) or the 12% 24% found in Sweden, where the wage setting mechanisms are similar to our case.
The remaining results in Table 3 are in line with the overall …ndings obtained earlier with the static model. The major di¤erence is that the inclusion of the lagged explained variable tends to reduce the magnitude of the estimated e¤ects of the other variables. The standard errors are also larger, which makes the estimates not statistically signi…cant. Therefore, di¤erences in rent-sharing among the three …rms' ownership are again not signi…cant, the bank size and …rm age e¤ects are considerably smaller and not signi…cant. The impact of the capital-ratio has an equal magnitude and sign but is not signi…cant. Di¤erences in pay level among …rms ownership, although sizable, are again not statistically signi…cant.
Conclusions
This paper measures the degree of rent-sharing degree in the Portuguese banking industry in the period 1988-2005. Using the …xed-e¤ects estimator and the system-GMM on a sample of 75 banks, we …nd an elasticity of wage with respect to pro…ts-per-employee that varies between :094 and :154, well above the usual benchmarks found previously. Our results, in contrast to Arai (2003) , may imply that wage-setting institutions do matter for the magnitude of rent-sharing.
